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Case No. 20151060-CA
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THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
TY WILLIAM MCLEOD,

Defendant/Appellant.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELIANT

INTRODUCTION

l;p

As required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), this reply brief is

"limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." The brief
does not restate arguments from the opening brief or address matters that do not
merit reply.
~

ARGUMENT

Officer Lampshire unlawfully extended the scope and duration of the
traffic stop in order to ask unrelated questions and conduct a Terry
frisk without reasonable suspicion; thus, suppression of the illegally
obtained evidence is required.
On appeal, McLeod challenges the trial court's order denying his motion to
suppress. See Aplt. Br. at 7-20. While the trial court correctly concluded that
Officer Lampshire lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity apart from the
traffic violation, its stated ground for denying McLeod's motion-that Lampshire
did not unconstitutionally extend the scope and duration of the traffic stop-was
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incorrect. See id. at 14-17. Specifically, in reaching this incorrect conclusion, the
trial court relied on the erroneous reasoning that Officer Lampshire's

~

suspicionless questioning and Terry frisk did not "extend[] the length of the stop
beyond the length of time it would have taken him to write a [traffic] citation had

the officer proceeded to do so." R.118 (emphasis added); Aplt. Br. at 14-16.
The State does not defend the trial court's reasoning and concedes that "the
trial court's denial of the suppression motion appears to have been based on an
incorrect understanding of the law." Aple. Br. at 10 n.1. Nevertheless, the State
asks this Court to "affirm on the alternative ground that defendant's prior
suspicious conduct in a high-crime drug area, combined with his conduct during
the traffic stop, constituted reasonable suspicion to support Defendant's further
brief detention." Id. at 9. This Court should reverse for the reasons in the
opening brief and reject the State's invitation to affirm on this alternate ground.
Specifically, the State's alternate theory must be rejected because it is not
sustainable by the facts as found by the trial court.

A. The State's alternate groundfor affirmance is not sustainable by the
factual findings of the trial court.
"It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed

from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,
even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower
court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court."' State v.
2
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Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r9, 76 P.3d 1159. "Although this court may affirm a
decision of the district court on alternate grounds, it falls to the party seeking the
benefit of the rule to explain why it is eligible to have the alternative arguments
considered." Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 2010 UT 62, ,r21, 248
P.3d 44 (emphasis in original).
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has "caution[ed]" that "the 'affirm on
any ground' rule of appellate review ... is a tool available only in limited
circumstances." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r13 n.3, 52 P .3d 1158. "In the
limited circumstance that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an alternate
ground, it may do so only where the alternate ground is apparent on the record."

Id. ,r20. And"[w]hen an alternate theory is apparent on the record, the court of
appeals must then determine whether the facts as found by the trial court are
sufficient to sustain the decision of the trial court on the alternate ground." Id.;
Id

Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ,r9; Angel Inv'rs, LLCv. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, ,r38, 216
P.3d 944.
In determining whether the alternate theory is factually sustainable, "[t]he
court of appeals is limited to the findings of fact made by the trial court and may
not find new facts or reweigh the evidence in light of the new legal theory or

~

alternate ground." Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ,r20; Angel Inv'rs, 2009 UT 40, ,I38. "It is
inappropriate for an appellate court to disregard the trial court's findings of fact
and to assume the role of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact."

Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ,r19; see also 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error§ 710 (1993) ("The
3
~
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reviewing court is confined to the facts specially found by the trial court [and t]he
reviewing court may not make findings of fact for or against appellant, and
cannot consider evidence to find facts or make a decision upon them or
supplement the facts found by the trial court with any additional facts").
For instance, in Bailey, the trial court supported its decision with
"somewhat limited yet specific findings of fact."

2002 UT 58, ,I5.

The court of

appeals subsequently affirmed the decision of the trial court on an alternative
ground that "was apparent on the record." Id. ,r,r5, 14. In doing so, it relied not
only on the trial court's "specific findings of fact," but also on witness testimony
and other evidence in the record. Id.

,r,r21-22.

On certiorari review, the Utah Supreme Court determined "that the court
of appeals in certain instances found facts beyond those found by the trial court."

Id.

,I22.

Therefore, it "assumed the role of fact finder and ... exceeded its proper

role." Id. Nevertheless, "[d]espite the court of appeals' error in finding additional
facts to bolster its affirmation of the trial court's decision," the Utah Supreme
Court upheld the court of appeals' decision to affirm on alternate grounds
because the alternate grounds were "supported by the trial court's original
findings of fact." Id.

,r,r22-25.

In this case, the State proposes an alternate ground for affirmance that
rests on ambiguous, disputed evidentiary hearing testimony, and not on the
"facts as found by the trial court." Id. ,I20. Specifically, the State invites this Court
to affirm on the alternate ground that Officer Lampshire had reasonable
4
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suspicion to extend the "traffic stop to investigate other possible criminal
conduct." Aple. Br. at 19. To try to support its argument, the State points to
Officer Lampshire's testimony concerning the following:
• Lampshire's experience with drug-related stops;
• McLeod's presence in an area known to be high in drug dealing;
• McLeod's movements before the traffic stop, "including his conduct
approaching three separate people" and his "prompt departure upon
learning that police were nearby";
• Observations of McLeod "moving all around" as Officer Lampshire
performed a records check during the traffic stop.
Aple. Br. at 16-18.
The trial court, however, made no findings on Lampshire's experience or
the character of the neighborhood. See R.115-19; 242-48. Nor did it make any
specific findings on McLeod's conduct before the traffic stop. See id. While the
trial court acknowledged that Lampshire "observ[ed] some additional activity"
prior to the traffic stop, the court did not elaborate on what that "additional
activity" entailed as it was "not[] material to the court's ruling." R. 243. The trial
court also did not find that McLeod was "moving all around" or otherwise
elaborate on the nature of McLeod's movements during the records check. See
R.115-19; 242-48. Rather, it only noted the following: "Based on alleged safety
concerns, which originate ... in part from observations from another officer who

5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

was present, Officer Lampshire asked Mr. McLeod to exit the vehicle and he
conducted a Terry frisk of Mr. McLeod." R.243 (emphasis added). 1
Despite the absence of findings on these matters, this was not a case where
the trial court made no findings of fact at all. Rather, as in Bailey, the trial court
made "specific findings of fact" after it reviewed the parties' memoranda, heard
the testimony of Officer Lampshire, and reviewed audio recordings of the
hearings. Bailey, 2002 UT 58, ,I20; R.115.
Put short, the State improperly premises its alternate theory on Officer
Lampshire's testimony rather than the factual findings of the trial court. Thus,
affirmance on this alternate ground would require this Court to "assume the role
of weighing evidence and making its own findings of fact." Bailey, 2002 UT 58,
,r19. To do so would not only "exceed[] [the] proper role" of this Court, id. ,r20,
but would require this Court to weigh evidence on factually '"[]disputed'" matters
In its conclusions of law, the trial court summarizes that "[t]he State
pointed to furtive movements made by the Defendant and some suspicious acts
by Defendant which the officer observed prior to the traffic stop, and argued that
these facts created reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity." R.117; see also
R.245. Simply asserting the State's argument does not amount to a factual finding
that McLeod made "furtive movements" or engaged in suspicious activity prior to
the traffic stop. See Angel Inv'rs, 2009 UT 40, ,r39. But even if the court's
statement could be construed as a factual finding, the trial court still did not
make findings on what those "suspicious acts" were, what those "furtive
movements" were, and when those "furtive movements" took place. Without
these critical details, affirmance on the State's alternate theory is inappropriate.
Indeed, generalized conclusions about "furtive movements" and "suspicious
behavior" do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Rather, reasonable
suspicion must be supported by "specific" and "articulable facts." State v. Valdez,
2003 UT App 100, ,r,r20-21, 68 P .3d 1052.
1
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that are not" unequivocally reveal[ed]"' by the record. Richardson v. Hart, 2009
UT App 387, 114, 223 P.3d 484 (quoting Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, 1114-15,
114 P.3d 580). It would also require the Court to resolve these factual issues in a
manner that is inconsistent with the record.
Before the trial court made its findings of fact and conclusions of law, it
heard-and rejected-arguments from the prosecutor that are similar to the
~

alternative arguments the State now makes in its brief. R.240-41; 245.
Specifically, the prosecutor argued that "it's quite possible the officer had
additional reasonable articulable suspicion of another crime" based on testimony
concerning McLeod's "presen[ce] in that high-crime area;" McLeod's
conversation with "three separate individuals who pointed out the officer's
presence" at which point McLeod "left ... very quickly;" and McLeod's "furtive
movements." R.240-41. Defense counsel disputed that the evidence showed
"anything other than a traffic violation." R.241-42. And for good reason.
Lampshire never testified that, based on his training and experience, there
was anything unusual about McLeod's presence in the area or his pre-traffic stop
movements. Moreover, the record did not "unequivocally reveal[]" what
happened prior to the traffic stop. Richardson, 2009 UT App 387, 114 (quoting

Baker, 2005 UT 32, 1114-15). While Lampshire testified that he "watched
[McLeod] go up to [] about three different people, and then they started pointing
that the cops were right there," it was unclear if these "three different people"
were together in a group or standing separately in various places. R.167. The
7
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testimony is also ambiguous as to whether McLeod was even present when the
individual(s) "started pointing that the cops were right there." Id. The prosecutor
appeared to assume that the "pointing" made McLeod aware of Officer
Lampshire's presence. See R.167-68. But the testimony also supports an
inference that when the pointing occurred, McLeod "had walked around the
corner" already and was no longer in the area. See R.168 (prosecutor asking
"what happened after these individuals made defendant aware that you were
there?" and Officer Lampshire responding "[h]e had walked around the corner
heading up towards Rio Grande from 500 West" (emphasis added)). And even if
the individuals did make McLeod aware of the police's presence, it was not clear
how soon thereafter McLeod left the area, let alone that he left "very quickly" or
"promptly" '"upon noticing the police."' R.241; Aple. Br. 17-18.
Similarly in question was the evidence regarding McLeod's movements
during the time Officer Lampshire performed the computer check. For one, the
record suggests that Officer Lampshire's view of McLeod was limited, as
Lampshire admitted that he could only "see the top of [McLeod's] head." R.169. It
is also unclear whether or to what extent Lampshire's claim that McLeod was
"moving all around" originated from Lampshire's personal observations relative
to the observations of his backup officer, who "was watching [McLeod]" at the
time, but did not testify. 2 R.169, 187. In any event, Officer Lampshire testified on

The trial court specifically acknowledged in its findings of fact that the
"observations," which gave rise to the "alleged safety concerns[,] originate[d] ... in
2
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cross-examination that it is "not shocking" when people continue to look for their
documents when unable to originally produce them, which would have explained
any "moving around" that was observed. R.176; see also R.238 (trial court
acknowledging that "[p]eople look for their driver's license[s]").
Not only would affirmance on the grounds urged by the State require this
Court to reweigh the evidence and resolve these factual issues, but it would also
require that the Court resolve them in a manner that is inconsistent with the
record. Indeed, the trial court ultimately determined that Officer Lampshire
lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity separate from the traffic
infraction. R.117, 245. Thus, the record suggests that the trial court resolved the
factual disparities in a manner consistent with innocent behavior and against a
finding of reasonable suspicion. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P .2d 774, 787 (Utah
1991) ("in cases in which factual issues are presented to and must be resolved by
the trial court but no findings of fact appear in the record, we "assume that the
trier of facts found them in accord with its decision'").
Last but not least, affirmance on the State's alternate theory would
implicate procedural due process concerns. See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876
(Utah 1996) ("At a minimum," procedural due process requires "'[t]imely and
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way"'). After

...;p

part from observations from another officer who was present." R.243. Thus, the
degree to which Officer Lampshire personally observed McLeod's movements
appeared to be important to the trial court.
9
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making its detailed oral findings of fact, the trial court asked the State to prepare
an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with its
ruling. R.248. Defense counsel subsequently requested, and the court specifically
afforded McLeod an opportunity to make objections to those findings. R.288-89.
Doing so afforded McLeod notice of the facts found by the trial court and an
opportunity to object to those facts. See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 876. But
when new facts are found on appeal-facts that were not included in the trial
court's specific factual findings-defendants, like McLeod, are deprived of notice
and the opportunity to bring objections to factual findings in the trial court.
In sum, the State's alternate theory depends on ambiguous, disputed
evidentiary hearing testimony that finds no support in the trial court's specific
findings of fact. Thus, this Court should reverse for the reasons in the opening
brief and reject the State's alternate ground for affirmance.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above and in the opening brief, Mr. McLeod respectfully
requests that his judgment of conviction be reversed.
SUBMITTED this ~day of November, 2016.
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